







Suppose that, since a recent thunderbolt, the oak by Lila’s house is frail. Hearing of 
an upcoming storm, she asks her neighbor Jack if he could help her cut it. She tells 
him that the tree is a hazard, that one cannot fell it alone, and that she will hire a saw 
in a distant city for the logging. Jack promises to be there to help. However, though 
he knows he is forgetful, he does not take measures to remind himself. And when 
the day comes, he fails to think of his promise, is nowhere to be found, and Lila has 
to return that saw without having cut a branch. What would it mean for Lila to forgive 
Jack for his promise breaking? A number of different accounts have been proposed.1 
But a common idea is that Lila forgives Jack if she first feels a negative reactive 
attitude toward him for having broken his promise, and then overcomes this attitude 
in a certain way.2 I will call this the standard account of forgiveness.  
I think this account is promising. But it raises a number of questions. A first 
range of questions concerns the nature of forgiveness—or how exactly Lila must 
overcome her negative attitudes in forgiving. If she tricked herself into believing that 
Jack was not blameworthy in the first place, and therefore no longer has any negative 
attitudes toward him, she has not really forgiven. So there is a question about when 
an overcoming of such attitudes amounts to forgiveness.3 A second range of 
questions concerns the norms of forgiveness—or when exactly Lila is warranted to 
forgive, or perhaps would not be warranted not to. If the oak destroyed her house 
in that storm and yet Jack never showed any remorse, it would seem problematically 
 
1 For instance, some people hold that forgiveness is the exercise of a normative power (e.g., 
Warmke, “The Normative Significance of Forgiveness”; Bennett, “The Alteration Thesis”), 
or the deliberate refusal to punish (e.g., Zaibert, “The Paradox of Forgiveness”), or a 
plurality of things with no clearly delineable essence (e.g., Neblett, “Forgiveness and 
Ideals”). 
2 The (contested) locus classicus of this is Butler, Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel. See 
also, e.g., Murphy and Hampton, Forgiveness and Mercy; Richards, “Forgiveness”; Holmgren, 
“Forgiveness and the Intrinsic Value of Persons”; Hughes, “What Is Involved in 
Forgiving?”; and Darwall, The Second-Person Standpoint, 72 (to name just a few authors in this 
tradition). 




condoning for Lila to forgive him straight away.4 On the other hand, if Jack has 
honestly apologized, organized the logging himself, and become a model of 
trustworthiness in the twenty-five years since then, it would seem problematically 
unforgiving for Lila to still bear her grudge.5 So there is a question about when the 
relevant overcoming of such attitudes is warranted. And these two questions are 
related. We can only really say when forgiveness is warranted once we know what it 
is. And we can determine what forgiveness is by reflecting on how overcoming such 
attitudes can be warranted.  
My aim in this paper is to begin to answer these questions about the standard 
account. There are many proposals about how to do so. But my sense is that they 
often cannot explain how forgiveness may be warranted, or do so in a manner that 
distorts what it is. To illustrate what I mean, I will outline, in section 2, the challenge 
of accounting for the norms of forgiveness. In section 3, I will introduce one of the 
most prominent versions of the standard account, due to Lucy Allais.6 If my 
arguments are sound, her account of why forgiveness can be warranted is dubious, 
and her picture of its nature both too narrow and too broad. But Allais will provide 
us with an important insight. So I will then introduce a novel version of the standard 
account by elaborating on what I take from her. My core idea is that the reactive 
attitudes are fundamentally agent-relative. They are a fitting response not just to 
someone’s blameworthiness, but to their blameworthiness being significant for you, 
or worthy of your caring, in virtue of your relationship to it. Someone’s 
blameworthiness is significant for you to the extent that you are bound up with what 
grounds it—e.g., with the wrongdoer’s being a participant in human relationships, 
or the victim’s being a source of demands. Thus you may fittingly not care about 
someone’s blameworthiness if it is sufficiently insignificant for you—e.g., if they 
lived in a distant time and place. And forgiveness revolves around this. Lila (fittingly) 
forgives Jack for his fault if and only if, partly out of goodwill toward him, she 
(fittingly) does not care about his blameworthiness anymore. To explain and support 
these ideas, I will elaborate in sections 4, 5, and 6 on the reactive attitudes in general. 
In section 7, I will relate this to forgiveness, and outline the proposal I have just 
sketched. 
Two clarifications before I begin. First, I will focus on resentment as the paradigm 
attitude at stake. Actually, I think other attitudes—e.g., forms of disappointment or 
contempt—may also play a role in forgiveness.7 And I think the story I will tell about 
resentment could be applied to these attitudes too. But for simplicity, I will focus 
 
4 For a forceful defense of this, see, e.g., Anderson, “When Justice and Forgiveness Come 
Apart.” 
5 See, e.g., Watson, “Standing in Judgment.” 
6 Allais, “Wiping the Slate Clean.” 
7 On disappointment, see, e.g., Richards, “Forgiveness,” 78; Smith, “Moral Blame and 
Moral Protest,” 38; Blustein, Forgiveness and Remembrance; and Fricker, “What’s the Point of 
Blame?” 172. On contempt, see, e.g., Pettigrove, Forgiveness and Love, 29. 
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just on resentment. Second, I will focus on overcoming as the paradigm process at 
issue. Some people hold that, in order to forgive, rather than overcoming your 
resentment in the right manner, you need to forswear it, or endorse your lack of 
resentment no matter why you do not feel it.8 I think there is an important sense in 
which you have not forgiven me if you have forsworn but not yet overcome your 
resentment, and forgiven me if you have overcome your resentment (in the right 
manner) but have not forsworn it, and similarly, an important sense in which you 
have not forgiven me if you actually do not resent me out of sheer contempt but 
endorse that lack of resentment for the right reasons, and forgiven me if you have 
overcome your resentment (in the right manner) but do not yet endorse your lack 
of it. But not too much hinges on this. The alternative versions of the account face 
similar questions, about whether any forswearing or endorsing amount to 
forgiveness and when such stances are warranted. So much of what I will say could 
be employed for these alternative accounts as well. But I will focus on overcoming. 
 
2. The Problem 
Let us start with the question about the norms of forgiveness. Suppose that, in 
breaking his promise, Jack responsibly evinced a wrongful attitude toward Lila. She 
has the standing to blame him for it—e.g., is not notoriously unreliable herself. And 
she knows this. If this was not so, it would in different ways be problematic for Lila 
to feel resentment in the first place. But, given these assumptions, there is a question 
about how she may be warranted in overcoming it. Resentment is an emotion, so 
the precise nature of the question will depend on the nature and norms of emotions. 
There is a large debate about this, which I cannot enter here. But here are three 
standard assumptions that I will accept for this paper. First, emotions have standards 
of “fittingness.” A certain fear of a dangerous snake is fitting—whereas fear of a 
totally harmless mouse, or excessive panic about a marginally dangerous dog, or a 
naively mild respect vis-à-vis an extremely dangerous moose, are not. Second, 
emotions have fittingness conditions in virtue of being representational: 
(intense/mild) fear represents its object as (very/moderately) dangerous, and is 
fitting if and only if this representation is correct. So if some proposition p is among 
the fittingness conditions of an emotion, that is because p is part of this emotion’s 
representational content.9 Third, fittingness is normative. That is, if the 
 
8 On forswearing, see, e.g., Strawson, “Freedom and Resentment,” 6; and Fricker, 
“Forgiveness.” On endorsing, see Schönherr, “When Forgiveness Comes Easy.” I will 
come back to one issue Schönherr raises in note 48. Still other formulations include 
“forbearing or withdrawing” (Darwall, The Second-Person Standpoint, 72) or “letting go of” 
(Griswold, Forgiveness, 40) resentment. 
9 For such an account of fittingness, see, e.g., D’Arms and Jacobson, “The Moralistic 
Fallacy”; Tappolet, “Values and Emotions”; and Rosen, “The Alethic Conception of Moral 
Responsibility.” For a dissenting voice on the idea that emotions are representational, see, 
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representational content of some emotion is p, then p is a reason for you to have 
that emotion, and not-p is a reason for you not to have it.10 We might say it is a 
“fittingness reason” (not) to have the relevant emotion.  
These assumptions are rough. There is a question, say, about the precise nature 
of emotional representation. Perhaps to have an emotion is to make a sort of 
judgment, or to (quasi-)perceive the world as being a certain way, or to have an 
intentional feeling toward it.11 There is also a question about why fittingness matters. 
Perhaps it is simply constitutive of our adopting specific emotions that we take their 
fittingness to provide reasons.12 Or perhaps there are (in addition) bridge principles 
linking fittingness to other sources of normativity: perhaps you have a moral reason 
to have fitting emotions about instantiations of moral value properties (like moral 
wrongness, unfairness, or blameworthiness), or it is part of the good life to generally 
have fitting emotions, or objectively good.13 And there is a question about whether 
there are other reasons for emotions—“non-fittingness reasons,” or reasons of the 
“wrong kind.” Suppose someone offers Lila $1,000 if, or tortures a cat unless, she 
resents Jack for his promise breaking. Perhaps this gives her a non-fittingness reason 
to resent him.14 Or perhaps it does not give her a reason to resent him, but only a 
reason to want to resent him, or to take actions to bring it about that she will.15 
These questions need not concern us. In what follows, I will only be concerned with 
fittingness reasons, without specifying the way in which emotions are 
representational, or why correct representation matters.16 For even these rough 
standard assumptions raise a puzzle about forgiveness.  
 
e.g., Hutto, “Truly Enactive Emotion”; also Deonna and Teroni, “Emotions as Attitudes.” 
For a survey of different accounts of fittingness, see Howard, “Fittingness.” 
10 See Howard, “Fittingness,” 3; for a dissenting voice, see, e.g., Maguire, “There Are No 
Reasons for Affective Attitudes.” 
11 On emotions as judgments, see, e.g., Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought; and Solomon, 
“Emotions and Choice.” On quasi-perceptions of the world, see, e.g., Prinz, Gut Reactions; 
and Tappolet, Emotions, Values, and Agency. On intentional feeling, see, e.g., Goldie, The 
Emotions. 
12 See, e.g., Sharadin, “Reasons Wrong and Right.” 
13 For a theory along the lines of the final idea, see, e.g., Hurka, Virtue, Vice, and Value, ch. 
1. 
14 See, e.g., Rabinowicz and Rønnow-Rasmussen, “The Strike of the Demon.” 
15 See, e.g., Kelly, “The Rationality of Belief and Some Other Propositional Attitudes”; 
Parfit, On What Matters, ch. 2 and appendix A; and Way, “Transmission and the Wrong 
Kind of Reason.” For a helpful survey of the discussion about “right kinds of reasons,” see 
Gertken and Kiesewetter, “The Right and the Wrong Kind of Reasons.” 
16 For what it is worth, I find it plausible that there are no wrong kinds of reasons for 
feeling an emotion. And I find all of the suggestions about why fittingness matters 
plausible. The idea that it is morally good to have or problematic to lack fitting emotions 
about moral value facts, in particular, can explain why forgiving too readily or not readily 
enough might itself be morally blameworthy—a form of being condoning or unforgiving 
that is morally objectionable.  
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What is the representational content of resentment? A common answer seems 
to be that if you feel resentment toward me for an action, you represent me as 
thereby having manifested an attitude toward you that was morally wrong and for 
which I was responsible; and the stronger your resentment, the more seriously wrong 
you represent my attitude as having been, or the more fully responsible you represent 
me as having been for it.17 So on this understanding, you can misrepresent the facts 
by feeling resentment where there was no fault (or responsible wrong) at all, or by 
feeling an excessively strong form in the face of what was (in terms of wrongness 
and responsibility) a relatively harmless fault, or a trivializingly mild annoyance in 
the face of what was (in these terms) an outrageous one. But this raises a problem. 
It suggests that in feeling less and less resentment toward Jack or eventually 
overcoming it altogether, Lila would represent his attitudes as less seriously wrong 
or him as less fully responsible—or eventually as not being at fault at all. After all, 
on the present understanding, these are the only dimensions along which the content 
of resentment can vary. Yet Jack was at fault. So, on these assumptions, Lila’s 
overcoming resentment seems to render her emotions unfitting. But we want an 
account on which Lila can forgive Jack fittingly, or without suggesting he was not at 
fault. 
But perhaps that is too quick. We might try to resolve this by considering what 
it means that an emotion is fitting. If emotions have fittingness conditions in virtue 
of being representational, then that an emotion is fitting does not mean you must feel 
it in order not to misrepresent the facts. Suppose Angeline does not know of Jack’s 
promise breaking in the first place, and therefore does not feel any indignation about 
it. Then she does not misrepresent Jack’s fault. She just does not represent it at all. 
Similarly, Lila need not come to misrepresent Jack’s fault in overcoming her 
resentment, but may just come to not represent it at all. And that is what she would 
do in forgiving, or so one might hold. But as an account of forgiveness, this is not 
convincing either. To begin with, it seems false that if Lila has forgiven she will lack 
any emotions about Jack’s fault. In coming to forgive, she will typically feel various 
(continuously weaker) forms of resentment. And, once she has forgiven, she might 
still feel sad that he wronged her, or be positively at peace with his fault, or even be 
grateful if it rendered her stronger. Indeed, it is unclear whether Lila can avoid any 
emotional representation of it. There is a difference between having no attitude 
toward something—e.g., simply not knowing about it—and feeling indifferent about 
it or reconciled with it. And at least as long as she knows of Jack’s fault, it seems she 
must have some attitude or other toward it, be it insouciance, propitiation, 
acquiescence, or whatever. But, in any case, most importantly, even if we could 
somehow describe her as not representing Jack’s fault, this would not give us the 
 
17 This is suggested, e.g., by Strawson, “Freedom and Resentment,” 23. In Strawson’s 
framework I am “responsible” for an attitude roughly just if it is mine (and I am a normal 




picture we want. On the present assumptions, resentment would still be the one 
fitting response to Jack’s negligence. So Lila could come to have an emotional state 
that is not unfitting, at best. But she would do so by failing to have the fitting response. 
She would manage to forgive only through a sort of emotional forgetting. Yet we 
arguably want an account on which Lila can have the (or at least a) positive fitting 
response to the fact that Jack wronged her. 
We could also try to resolve our problem with a more complex account of 
resentment. For instance, we might suggest that if you feel resentment toward me 
for an action, you represent me as thereby having manifested an attitude toward you 
that was wrong and for which I was responsible and for which I still have not felt 
any remorse. This would explain how Lila may fittingly overcome her resentment, 
at least once Jack has felt remorse. It would raise the substantive question of whether 
remorse really is necessary for forgiveness. Personally I think it is not, and that Lila 
may sometimes forgive Jack even if he has not properly repented. But set this aside 
for the moment.18 The present idea has a more fundamental problem. It implies that 
once Jack has felt remorse, any further resentment would be unfitting. More generally, 
it now seems that once it is fitting for Lila to no longer resent Jack, it would eo ipso 
be unfitting for her to still resent him. But this too is unfortunate. It seems that Lila 
could, sometimes, fittingly not feel resentment even when she could also fittingly 
feel it. That is why forgiveness can be a “gift”: it is not something she must always 
either offer or refuse in order to respond fittingly to Jack’s fault. So we want an 
account on which Lila can have discretion in fitting forgiveness—on which she can, 
at least sometimes, fittingly forgive Jack but also fittingly refrain from forgiving.19  
In sum, there is a question about why to overcome resentment is not to 
misrepresent the facts, or to simply omit any representation of them, or the only way 
to represent them correctly. How can we sometimes fittingly overcome our 
resentment without taking refuge to emotional forgetting and without it being 
unfitting to continue to feel it? Forgiveness seems either unwarranted or required or 
 
18 Kolnai, “Forgiveness.” For the view that remorse or a “change of heart” is crucial, or 
that “unconditional forgiveness” is inappropriate, see, e.g., Novitz, “Forgiveness and Self-
Respect,” esp. 314; Griswold, Forgiveness, esp. 121f.; Couto, “Reactive Attitudes, 
Forgiveness, and the Second-Person Standpoint”; and Milam, “Reasons to Forgive.” For 
the view that it need not be, see, e.g., Calhoun, “Changing One’s Heart”; Holmgren, 
“Forgiveness and the Intrinsic Value of Persons”; Garrard and McNaughton, “In Defense 
of Unconditional Forgiveness”; Ware, “Forgiveness and Respect for Persons”; and Fricker, 
“Forgiveness.” 
19 A related idea is sometimes expressed by saying that forgiveness is “elective”; see, e.g., 
Allais, “Elective Forgiveness.” However, Allais means by this that the wrongdoer cannot, 
or “paradigmatically” does not (642) have a moral claim to being forgiven. Again, my claim 
above is (at least in the first instance) about fittingness rather than moral obligations; and I 
am only claiming that we can sometimes fittingly forgive but also fittingly refrain from it—
not that that is always so. For objections to Allais’s stronger claim, see e.g., Milam, “Against 
Elective Forgiveness.”  
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at best an emotional void. Echoing Aurel Kolnai, we might call this the (apparent) 
“paradoxy of forgiveness.”20 
 
3. Allais’s Proposal 
Before I attempt to solve this problem, let us consider one of the most prominent 
developments of the standard account of forgiveness, due to Lucy Allais.21 If I am 
right, Allais’s proposal is not successful. But it can teach us important lessons. So it 
will help us to start here. The core of Allais’s account is a conception of what it is to 
blame someone. We generally have beliefs about other people’s characters. But Allais 
suggests that we also have a way of “feeling about” or “affectively seeing” them as 
people.22 This is not so much a matter of our beliefs, but of the emotions we are 
disposed to feel toward them, the expectations with which we encounter them, the 
patterns of attention with which we see them, and so on. Allais calls this our 
“affective attitude” toward a person. And she holds that Lila blames Jack for his 
promise breaking if she lets it influence her affective attitude toward him. In doing 
so she “affectively sees” this fault as “centrally attaching to [his] character,” and thus 
“holds it against him.”23 Correspondingly, Lila forgives Jack for his promise breaking 
if, without coming to believe that he was not culpable for it, she ceases to let it 
influence her affective attitude toward him. In doing so, she ceases to affectively 
regard it as attaching to his character, and thus “wipes the slate clean” with respect 
to this fault.24 
Allais provides an elaborate story about why this may be fitting. It relies on two 
claims. The first is skepticism about character judgments. Allais argues that we are 
“never perfectly positioned to judge people’s characters,” that such judgments are 
“always underdetermined by the evidence”—and specifically, that they are never 
“epistemically mandate[d]” by a person’s responsible wrongdoing.25 In other words, 
even if Lila knows that Jack is culpable for his promise breaking, she will not have 
conclusive evidence about whether it expresses his character. The second claim is a 
view about fittingness. According to Allais, that an attitude is fitting does not mean 
that it is “epistemically mandated” by your evidence—but rather, that it is 
“epistemically permissible” or “not contradicted” by it.26 And within the range of 
 
20 Kolnai (“Forgiveness,” 99) highlighted the rough problem that “forgiveness is either 
unjustified or pointless.” Yet my problem is somewhat different from Kolnai’s. I am 
concerned with the fittingness of emotions. Kolnai is not. As far as I can see, no one has 
stated the problem in precisely the manner I have. 
21 Allais, “Wiping the Slate Clean.” See also Allais, “Elective Forgiveness.” 
22 Allais, “Wiping the Slate Clean,” passim. 
23 Allais, “Wiping the Slate Clean,” 51, passim. 
24 Allais, “Wiping the Slate Clean,” passim. 
25 Allais, “Wiping the Slate Clean,” 60. 
26 Allais, “Wiping the Slate Clean,” 62, 60.  
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what is not contradicted by your evidence, she suggests, your attitude may 
permissibly be a matter of what you “pay attention to.”27 In other words, an affective 
attitude toward Jack is fitting so long as it is not contradicted by conclusive evidence 
about his character. His promise breaking neither provides conclusive evidence that 
it centrally attaches to his character nor that it does not. So Lila may fittingly come 
to adopt an affective attitude toward Jack that is not influenced by his promise 
breaking, and thus forgive him. But she may also fittingly (continue to) have an 
affective attitude toward him that is influenced by it, or refrain from forgiving. 
What is appealing about this is that Allais separates the belief in 
blameworthiness from the actual attitude of blame. According to Allais, there are 
different criteria for when we must believe someone is blameworthy and when we 
must actually blame them in order to have correct beliefs and fitting emotions: we 
can fittingly refrain from blaming the blameworthy. In this sense, blameworthiness 
does not eo ipso “mandate” blame, and blame is more than an emotional registering 
just of someone’s blameworthiness. I think this is right, and relevant for forgiveness.  
But Allais’s way of explaining it is not fully convincing. Most fundamentally, 
her picture of attitudes is dubious. It is not true that an attitude is (subjectively) fitting 
as long as there is no conclusive evidence against it. Suppose Theodore and Luke 
tell Lila how they judge Glory. Theodore reports that Glory once kindly helped him, 
and that he generally knows her as generous and kind hearted. Luke says she once 
strangely refused him a favor, and that he generally finds her ill-natured and mean. 
Suppose Lila regards them as equally reliable, has no other evidence, and tries to 
form a fitting attitude toward Glory. Allais suggests that she could now choose what 
to “pay attention to”—and may fittingly disregard Theodore’s positive opinion and 
be outright critical about Glory, or vice versa. But this seems wrong.28 Lila’s attitude 
is only (subjectively) fitting if it reflects her epistemic situation: if to some extent she 
withholds attitude, or perhaps tentatively regards Glory as being multifaceted. 
Inconclusive evidence makes certain specific stances (subjectively) fitting. It itself 
does not give us any discretion. So similarly, if Lila has insufficient evidence about 
whether Jack’s promise breaking reflects his character, her attitude toward him is 
only fitting if it reflects this: if she withholds attitude, or perhaps regards him as 
capricious. Her lack of evidence per se does not make it fitting for her to ignore our 
incident outright. If Lila has discretion in fitting forgiveness, it must be grounded in 
the facts, or in the positive evidence she possesses. 
Also, the relevant facts do not seem to be just whether Jack’s fault is 
characteristic. It is an unduly narrow picture on which blame is all about character 
assessment. Of course, we sometimes have insufficient evidence about whether a 
wrong expresses someone’s character. But at least on an ordinary understanding of 
“character,” and ordinary standards of evidence, our evidence is often sufficient. 
And in some such cases we still have discretion in forgiveness. Lila might know that 
 
27 Allais, “Wiping the Slate Clean,” 61. 
28 A related point is made by Ware, “Forgiveness and Respect for Persons,” 253. 
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Jack’s promise breaking is characteristic—e.g., expressive of his general insensitivity 
to the commitments he has entered. But perhaps nothing much happened as a result 
of his fault. And perhaps Lila managed not to depend on Jack any further, to just 
enjoy his endearing cheerfulness in brief encounters, his childlike absorption in the 
moment, or the oblivious kindheartedness with which he often does her a favor—
and thus to see his whole unreliability with enough distance to simply not bother 
about it anymore. In that case, she might arguably fittingly cease to resent this entire 
character trait of Jack’s. Or again, she might know that our promise breaking is not 
characteristic—e.g., if our incident lies in the past, and Jack has genuinely felt 
remorse and truly managed to become reliable. But perhaps that windstorm 
unrooted the oak so that it destroyed Lila’s nineteenth-century family house. And 
perhaps Lila cut off all further interactions with him afterward—and never got over 
the fact that due to the muddler he was she has lost that treasured place. And in that 
case, she might fittingly continue to feel a certain grudge about that promise 
breaking. These responses would not simply be unfitting, or mistaken, as resentment 
would be if Jack had not been at fault in the first place. Blame and forgiveness are 
not all about character assessment. They are much more complex responses, it 
seems. 
In another respect, however, Allais’s account of forgiveness seems too broad. 
She does not say how Lila must come to a changed attitude toward Jack. But some 
ways of wiping the slate clean do not amount to forgiveness. Suppose Lila saw it as 
detrimental to her well-being that she is holding his fault against Jack. And suppose 
she therefore banged her head on the table until the blows severed the associative 
ties she drew between him and the incident, and it no longer affected her attitude 
toward him. Or suppose that Lila’s mother died on the evening after the promise 
breaking, and her associative ties between Jack’s promise breaking and the death of 
her mother are so strong that she somehow never holds it against Jack—just because 
whenever the incident comes up, the question of how to evaluate her neighbor 
dwindles into oblivion. In these cases, it seems, she has not properly forgiven. Not 
all ways of ceasing to affectively regard Jack’s fault as attaching to his character are 
forms of forgiveness.29  
Suppose all of this is right. Then our discretion in fitting forgiveness is 
grounded in the positive facts, not in our epistemic limitations. There is a complex 
 
29 Interestingly, Allais discusses the fact that some forms of overcoming negative reactive 
emotions do not amount to forgiveness (e.g., “Wiping the Slate Clean,” 43f., 57f.). She cites 
“forgetting the wrong,” “putting the wrongdoer out of your mind,” or “regarding her as 
beneath your concern” as examples (58). According to Allais, these things do not amount 
to forgiveness because they do not involve “a change in your [affective] view of the 
wrongdoer” (58) with respect to their wrong: they just mean you lack any such affective 
attitude toward them. My point is that even Allaisian changes in your affective view of the 
wrongdoer need not amount to forgiveness. That is because Allais does not add any 
constraints about how you must come to cease to affectively regard a fault as attaching to 
the character of your wrongdoer in order to forgive. 
 
10 
variety of grounds for blame and forgiveness beyond character assessment. And yet 
not any way of wiping the slate clean amounts to forgiving. We must look for an 
alternative solution to our problem. So let us now turn to the account I propose.30 
 
4. The Core Idea: The Significance of a Wrong 
My proposal will build on Allais’s idea that we can fittingly refrain from blaming 
people even if they are blameworthy. But I will account for it differently. My core 
suggestion will be that the representational content of resentment is more complex 
than the common assumption has it. The reactive attitudes are a response to 
someone’s (putatively) responsibly evincing wrongful attitudes. But they are not just 
a response to that. This can be argued without reference to forgiveness. So in this 
and the following two sections I will set forgiveness aside and sketch a picture of the 
reactive attitudes that is independently plausible.31 I will come back to forgiveness in 
section 7. 
It is worth bringing to mind some commonplace facts. A myriad of people have 
at some point somewhere responsibly evinced wrongful attitudes, and we often 
know of that and respond to it emotionally. Yet we generally do not adopt 
proportionally strong reactive attitudes toward all of these faults. Suppose Lila knew that 
Emperor Hadrian was wittingly betrayed by his friend and predecessor Trajan in 
second-century Rome. And suppose she also knew that her husband, Robert, was 
wittingly betrayed by his friend Marcelle in precisely the same manner. Suppose she 
responds with some mild indignation to the first case, but with quite strong 
indignation to the second. This would be entirely natural. We would say that she cares 
more about Marcelle’s fault than about Trajan’s. Indeed, intuitively, such unequal 
caring seems warranted, or supported by reasons. Generally, there are reasons for 
you to care more or less about facts. The fact that Marcelle harmed her husband is a 
reason for Lila to care about her fault. But the fact that Trajan lived in ancient Rome, 
or was five feet, eight inches tall, or perhaps had the same number of hairs as Lila 
generally is not a reason for her to care about his fault. So given her relation to 
Robert, and her lack of any relationship to our Romans, it seems warranted for Lila 
to care more about Marcelle’s fault than about Trajan’s. Marcelle’s fault concerns 
Lila more, or has more normative import or significance for her. Indeed, something 
even stronger seems true. If caring is a response to reasons, and if there is no good 
 
30 For some alternative proposals (differing from Allais’s and mine), see, e.g., Kolnai, 
“Forgiveness”; Murphy and Hampton, Forgiveness and Mercy; Hieronymi, “Articulating an 
Uncompromising Forgiveness”; Calhoun, “Changing One’s Heart”; Callard, “The Reason 
to Be Angry Forever”; or Na’aman, “The Fitting Resolution of Anger.” 
31 Here and in what follows, I say “putative(ly)” because whether you respond with a 
certain emotion ultimately depends on whether you take something to have a certain 
property, rather than on whether it actually has it.  
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reason for her to care about Trajan’s fault but plenty of reason to care about 
Marcelle’s, it would in an important sense be unwarranted for Lila to care equally 
much about either. If she got worked up equally much, or little, about either fault, 
her caring would be at odds with her reasons to care, or with the grossly unequal 
significance that these faults have for her. She would ignore the import of her 
relations.  
Now what kinds of reasons are these reasons to care? We might try to suggest 
that they are non-fittingness reasons. We might stick with the simple view about the 
representational content of the reactive attitudes (from section 2), on which the 
fittingness of a certain degree of indignation is determined fully by the degree of the 
wrongdoer’s fault. On this view, the uniquely fitting response for Lila would be equal 
indignation at Trajan and Marcelle. But we might suggest that Lila has non-
fittingness reasons to (get herself to) care more about Marcelle’s fault: prudential or 
moral reasons to be emotionally invested in her husband, say, but insouciant about 
our Romans. So it is somehow all-things-considered reasonable for her (to get herself) 
to feel unequal indignation at them. But this seems dubious. First, it seems to 
intuitively mischaracterize caring. There are nonrepresentational feelings for which 
there are only non-fittingness reasons—like hunger, tiredness, or pain. But, 
intuitively, the attitude of caring seems different. It seems propositional or 
representational. Something’s being significant for you seems a reason for you to 
care in much the same way as something’s being dangerous is a reason for you to be 
afraid. Second and more specifically, the suggestion seems to misdescribe Lila. 
Suppose someone offers her $1,000 if, or tortures a cat unless, she feels resentment 
at her chair. Perhaps this gives her prudential or moral reasons to (get herself to) 
resent it: to misrepresent the facts, or emotionally pretend her furniture was 
blameworthy while knowing it is not. But intuitively our case is different. In 
responding more strongly to Marcelle’s fault than to Trajan’s, she does not seem to 
misrepresent anything, or involve herself in a contradiction between her emotions 
and her beliefs. In particular, Lila’s emotions need not represent Marcelle as having 
evinced worse attitudes than Trajan, or as being more responsible for them. Lila may 
know that Marcelle and Trajan are equal in these respects, and intuitively her 
attitudes need not contradict this. Indeed, third, recall that Lila’s emotions are 
entirely standard. So the proposal implies that all of us are constantly involved in 
blatant misrepresentations of people’s faults, or contradictions among our 
representational mental states. Such widespread attribution of error seems hard to 
bear. If anything, it seems, Lila emotions would misrepresent the facts if she got 
worked up as little about Marcelle’s fault as about Trajan’s, or as much about Trajan’s 
as about Marcelle’s. In doing so, she would falsely pretend that these faults concern 
her equally little, or much. She would misrepresent their unequal significance for her.  
I do not see any convincing way of salvaging a non-fittingness interpretation of 
Lila’s reasons to care. More plausibly, these reasons of significance are fittingness 
reasons. Something’s being significant for you makes it fitting for you to care about 
it. That is to say, its significance is part of the representational content of your 
response toward it. So in the remainder of this paper, I will try to turn these first 
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intuitions into a more full-fledged account of the fittingness of reactive emotions. 
Let us first clarify the idea of significance. It is not that something either is or is not 
significant for you. Take Trajan’s betrayal of Hadrian. This betrayal may make a 
range of emotions fitting in virtue of instantiating a range of value properties. 
Perhaps it proved the theory of some diligent twentieth-century historian, allowed 
her a publication, and got her a deserved career. If so, as something that was good 
for that historian, our betrayal may make it fitting to be glad. Perhaps it constituted 
an aesthetically compelling narrative, and as such may make it fitting to feel aesthetic 
appreciation. Perhaps it amazingly figured in a dream of a Peruvian farmer who knew 
nothing of ancient Rome, and as such may make it fitting to be amazed. And I 
assume it also makes it fitting to feel indignation or resentment. I will say it does so, 
specifically, as something for which Trajan is blameworthy. So our betrayal may be 
significant for you in different respects, or as an instantiation of different properties. 
For our diligent historian, the betrayal seems significant as something that was good 
for her. This property of the betrayal concerns her. But it does not seem significant 
for her as something for which Trajan is blameworthy. She does not have any 
personal relationship to our Romans. For Trajan’s and Hadrian’s friends, in contrast, 
our fact will be significant as something for which Trajan is blameworthy, but 
insignificant as something good for our historian. And for still other people, it might 
be significant in still other ways.  
Here is how I will understand this more formally. By saying that some x is 
(more/less) significant for you as an instantiation of a certain objective value property 
F, I mean that, due to your relationship to the fact that x is F, it is fitting for you to 
be (more/less) affected by the emotions that x’s being F ultimately makes agent-
neutrally fitting. If you are (more/less) so affected, due to your (putative) 
relationship to x’s being F, I will say you care (more/less) about x as an instantiation 
of F. Indeed, for you to care (more/less) about x as an instantiation of F just is for 
you to be (more/less) affected by the emotions that x’s being F ultimately makes 
agent-neutrally fitting due to your (putative) relationship to the fact that x is F. Put 
simply, significance makes it fitting for us to care, and caring is our response to 
(putative) significance.32 But caring is not an extra emotion, alongside indignation, 
gladness, or admiration, say. It is a component of your feeling another emotion to a 
certain degree. And in this sense, the significance of x as F for you will be part of 
the representational content of your response to x’s being F. 
 
32 Note that, in this explication, x might be anything—a fact, an event, an object, or 
whatever. By “objective value properties” I mean value properties that are not essentially 
relative to you (e.g., to your epistemic situation), perhaps like something’s being 
disappointing or surprising. What I say could be extended to such essentially relative 
properties too. But for simplicity, I focus on objective ones. By the emotions that some 
fact “ultimately makes agent-neutrally fitting,” I mean those it would make fitting for an 
impartial spectator, or regardless of its agent-relative significance.  
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Let us spell this out for the reactive emotions. I will assume that what my being 
blameworthy for a fault ultimately makes fitting are specifically (and only) the 
negative reactive attitudes. So that my fault is (more/less) significant for you as 
something for which I am blameworthy means that due to your relationship to the 
fact that I am blameworthy for it, it is fitting for you to be affected (more/less) by 
the resentment or indignation my fault ultimately makes agent-neutrally fitting. And 
if you therefore feel (more/less) indignation at me, you care (more/less) about my 
fault as something for which I am blameworthy. Indeed, for you to care (more/less) 
about my fault in this respect just is for you to feel (more/less) indignation at me, in 
response to my fault’s (putatively) being (more/less) significant for you as something 
for which I am blameworthy. Thus your overall degree of indignation among else 
comprises your caring. In feeling a certain indignation at me, you represent me as 
thereby having manifested an attitude toward you that was morally wrong and for 
which I was responsible, and represent my fault as being significant for you. The 
stronger your resentment, the more seriously wrong you represent my attitude as 
having been, or the more fully responsible you represent me as having been for it, or 
the more significant you represent it as being for you. In this sense, the reactive 
attitudes, like other emotions, have an agent-relative element. They are not just a 
response to faults. They are a response to faults that are (putatively) significant for 
you. 
This is the account I will develop in what follows. And this, I suggest, is why 
we can fittingly refrain from blaming people even if they are blameworthy. Lila’s 
mild form of indignation at Trajan need not falsely represent him as not being equally 
blameworthy as Marcelle. It can correctly represent his fault as equally serious, but 
less significant for Lila than Marcelle. To anticipate, I will suggest that Lila would 
forgive Jack for his promise breaking if she did not care about it anymore, as 
something for which he is blameworthy, and thus represented it as being sufficiently 
insignificant. But before I turn to forgiveness, let me elaborate more on this picture. 
 
5. The Reasons of Significance 
I have indicated what kind of reasons may be relevant for overcoming resentment: 
fittingness reasons of significance, which you have in virtue of your relationship to 
someone’s fault, as something for which they are blameworthy. The weaker your 
relationship to it, the weaker your reasons to care. But what relationship to 
something’s instantiating a value property makes it significant for you as an 
instantiation of it? When do you have reasons to care about something? 
This important question seems underexplored in the theory of emotions, and 
would be worth devoting an entire book to.33 But I suggest the answer has to do 
 
33 Though for very interesting explorations, see, e.g., Helm, Emotional Reason; Kolodny, 
“Which Relationships Justify Partiality?”; and Lord, “Justifying Partiality.” 
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with what grounds the relevant property instantiation: x is significant for you as an 
instantiation of F to the extent that you are bound up with what grounds the fact 
that x is F. Trajan’s betrayal is significant for you as something that was bad for 
Hadrian to the extent that you are bound up with the grounds of this badness—e.g., 
involved with Hadrian’s suffering. It is significant for you as something that was 
good for our historian to the extent that you are bound up with the grounds of this 
goodness—e.g., confronted with her joy or the benefits she reaps from her career. 
In a thorough general answer to our question, the phrase of your being “bound up” 
with something would have to be spelled out more. But I will assume we have a 
certain intuitive understanding of it, and for present purposes this will suffice. So 
rather than elaborating on this general criterion, let me say how I think it applies to 
blame. 
Suppose a wrongdoer is blameworthy for wronging a victim. If I am right, his 
blameworthiness will be significant for you to the extent that you are bound up with 
what grounds it. So what will that be? There are different stories, but let us assume 
the picture of Strawson.34 On this picture, our blameworthiness is essentially 
grounded in our “involvement … in inter-personal human relationships.”35 For 
Strawson, it is a constitutive feature of a normal interpersonal relationship that we 
demand of others a certain form of goodwill or regard toward us.36 The presence of 
this demand distinguishes such relationships from those we have toward children or 
psychopaths. And to make such a demand just is to respond with negative reactive 
attitudes to its violations.37 If this is roughly right, then what grounds our 
wrongdoer’s blameworthiness is the fact that the victim is a source of demands on 
our attitudes, that the wrongdoer is a responsible person with whom we stand in 
relationships shaped by such demands, and that his attitude toward the victim 
violated a demand she is a source of.  
So, for one thing, his blameworthiness will be more significant for you the more 
you are bound up with the importance of the pertinent demand. Most prominently, 
it will be more significant for you the more you are bound up with the victim, or with 
the fact that she is not just something that is fascinating for biochemistry, say, but a 
source of moral demands. When precisely you are so bound up with her depends on 
what about her grounds these demands. But plausibly, you will be bound up with 
her in this manner if you are involved with the value of her leading the life she 
chooses, faring well, and being embedded as a member in equal standing in a moral 
community—if you have been confronted with this value and it matters or should 
matter to you. Other things equal, it is fitting for Lila to care more if someone got 
aggressive and broke her husband’s nose than if that person got aggressive and broke 
the nose of a stranger. Indeed, other things equal, it would be unfitting for her to 
 
34 Strawson, “Freedom and Resentment.” 
35 Strawson, “Freedom and Resentment,” 9. 
36 Strawson, “Freedom and Resentment,” 15. 
37 Strawson, “Freedom and Resentment,” 23. 
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care more about the fault that affected a stranger than the fault that affected her 
husband. Her caring would be at odds with her reasons to care, or her involvement 
with the victims. She is more bound up with her husband as a source of demands 
than with a person she has never met.  
For another thing, a wrongdoer’s blameworthiness will be more significant for 
you the more you are bound up with the wrongdoer, or with the fact that he is not just 
an object of historical studies or social planning, but an object of moral demands, or 
a person in human relationships shaped by them. And this will be the case to the 
extent that you actually stand in such a relationship with him. When precisely you 
do, or to what extent, is a complex issue. Plausibly, you may have such a relationship 
even to people you do not literally interact with, as when you regard your favorite 
author or a stranger under the guise of a fellow person. But you are more fully 
involved with someone to the extent that you actually share your life or navigate a 
common space with them. Other things equal, it is fitting for Lila to care more about 
xenophobia in her mother than about the same xenophobia in a stranger, even if the 
relevant victims are the same. Indeed, it would be unfitting, or at odds with the 
import of these faults for her, if she cared more about the fault of a stranger than 
that of her mother. She is more bound up with her mother as an object of 
interpersonal demands.  
But these are only roughly the main determinants of significance. There are a 
host of other factors beyond this. Most importantly, if your involvement with the 
wrongdoer matters, his response to his wrong matters too. At least insofar as you 
actually interact with him, you stand in a relationship with the present person, not 
with whom he once was. So the more he distances himself from his fault through 
remorse and a change for the better, the less it manifests a deficiency in a relationship 
in which you actually stand, or in a person whose being the object of demands you 
are bound up with. The more he separates himself from his wrongful attitudes, the 
less you are involved with his past demand violation, or with what grounded the fact 
that he was to blame. His past self will be a bit like a stranger. Other things equal, it 
is fitting for Lila to care more about her brother’s wrongful outburst of rage if he 
has never felt remorse for it than if he has felt genuine guilt and has since tried hard 
and succeeded to be placid.  
Moreover, it is not that you will simply have a more or less close relationship 
to a wrongdoer. You have different relationships with different people, or 
relationships to specific aspects of them. So you are more fully bound up with the 
fact that a wrongdoer violated a demand the more that demand is important in the 
specific relationship you have to him. It might affect Lila that her neighbor Jack is 
endearingly cheerful in brief encounters, that he fully respects her privacy, and that 
he is generally very happy to do her a favor. But Jack’s stubbornness in political 
matters, or his cowardice, or his characteristics as an employer, might be largely 
irrelevant to their relation. So while it is fitting for Lila to care more about Jack’s 
political stubbornness than about that of a total stranger, other things equal, it is 
fitting for her to care even more about that stubbornness in Louisa, with whom she 
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interacts in the local government. And that is so even if she does not have a closer 
relationship to Louisa than to Jack on the whole.  
Similarly, it is not just your relationship to the victim that determines how much 
you are bound up with the relevant demand. There are other ways in which you 
might be bound up with it, or its grounds, or the grounds of why it is important. For 
instance, you are more involved with the importance of a demand if you have 
experienced how a violation of it can be harmful. You are more fully bound up with 
the demand to drive cautiously if as a result of someone’s reckless driving you have 
once lost a child. The same may be true if you have dedicated your life to victims of 
road accidents. And something similar holds, all the more poignantly, if the present 
reckless driving had terrible consequences that you are involved with. Other things 
equal, it is fitting for Lila to care more if her friend Della drove recklessly and killed 
the child of Lila’s neighbors than if she luckily did not harm anyone.38  
All of this is rough, and plausibly not exhaustive. But it illustrates the general 
idea. The emerging overall picture is that our patterns of significance form a complex 
web. On the one hand, significance is infectious: if some things are significant for 
you in certain respects, then so are others that are appropriately connected to them. 
If the value of that house is significant for Lila, then so is Jack’s promise breaking, 
which puts it at peril. On the other hand—and as will become important later on—
significance must always be relative: if certain things are significant for you in certain 
respects, then others that are not connected to them will have to become less 
significant for you in comparison. If on the same evening there is a train crash that kills 
Lila’s mother, Jack’s promise breaking will suddenly be relatively insignificant next 
to it. The more specific upshot is that it is fitting for you to care about a wrongdoer’s 
blameworthiness to the extent that you are bound up with the victim as a source of 
demands and the wrongdoer as a participant in human relationships—or specifically, 
to the extent that the wrong is still associable with the wrongdoer’s attitudes, matters 
in your relationship to him, actually harmed you, and so on. These reasons are part 
of what reactive attitudes respond to, and of what they represent. Or so I claim.  
 
6. The Discretion in Caring  
I have suggested what kind of reasons our reasons of significance are. I have made 
a proposal about when they arise. The significance of a value fact for you, we might 
say, is a quantity determined by how much you are bound up with its grounds, and 
determining how much caring is fitting in response to it. It remains to examine what 
the effect of these reasons will be. If significance is such a quantity, does that mean 
 
38 I think this grounds an important kind of moral luck, which I explore in Riedener, 
“Don’t Make a Fetish of Faults.” Scanlon makes a similar claim, within his different 
conception of “blame” (Moral Dimensions, 147ff.). 
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you must always care to one specific degree in order to have fitting attitudes? Or 
may you generally care to different degrees and still have fitting emotions?  
At least in theory, there are two extreme views about how much discretion in 
fitting caring you have. One the one hand, one might think you have total such 
discretion. You can always care as much or as little as you please, without your caring 
ever being unfitting. On the other hand, one might think you have no such discretion 
at all. Given your relationship to a fault and to everything else, there is always just a 
single degree to which you can fittingly care. I have already suggested that the first 
view is intuitively implausible. Some forms of caring seem unfitting. Suppose Lila’s 
close friend Della drove with outrageous recklessness, killed Lila’s nephew, and 
hardly showed any remorse. And suppose someone named Edward drove with that 
very same recklessness a hundred years ago on the other side of the planet, but did 
not cause any harm, soon felt deep remorse, and drove with uttermost caution ever 
after.39 Other things equal, Lila cannot hold that the second incident concerns her 
more than the first. It just does not. And if she cared very much about Edward’s but 
very little about Della’s fault, her attitudes would misrepresent the significance of 
these faults for her. In caring about a fault, there is generally a minimal degree to 
which you must and a maximal degree to which you may care about it, in order for 
your caring to be fitting.  
Why is this so? Well, it just follows from the fact that caring is a representational 
response to significance, in the manner I have suggested in section 4. Suppose you 
could feel extreme “shfear” in response to a totally harmless mouse, and no shfear 
at all in response to a very dangerous snake, without this being an unfitting response 
to the dangerousness of these animals. Then shfear would not be a representational 
response to danger. It would be a nonrepresentational feeling like hunger, or perhaps 
a representational response to something altogether different. Similarly, suppose you 
could care very much about one fact that intuitively did not concern you at all, and 
very little about another fact that concerned you very much, and your caring would 
not be an unfitting response to the significance of these facts for you. Then caring 
would not be a representational response to significance. It would be a 
nonrepresentational feeling, or a representational response to something else. But it 
is a representational response to significance, or so I have argued. 
However, to some extent at least you are free in how much you care. It is not 
always just one degree of caring that is fitting. Suppose Lila’s acquaintance Grace 
once drove with a recklessness equal to Della’s and Edward’s. And say Lila has long 
had a good but rather impersonal relationship to Grace, that Grace’s driving took 
 
39 Recall that I regard the degree of your fault as being fully determined by the wrongness 
of, and your responsibility for, your attitude. Whether or not, unluckily or luckily, you end 
up harming someone with a given attitude does not determine the degree of your fault. It 
determines its significance. So as I understand the cases involving reckless driving in this 
section, the faults of the agents are the same. They only differ in significance for Lila. (On 
significance and moral luck, see also note 38 and the paragraph to this note.) 
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place in distant Anchorage and damaged a fence post, and that she felt considerable 
but not quite the remorse she should have. These facts may determine some limits 
to Lila’s caring. Other things equal, she can neither fittingly pretend that Grace’s 
fault does not concern her at all (or less than Edward’s), nor that it concerns her 
tremendously much (or more than Della’s). But in between these extremes, she 
arguably has a large range of degrees of caring that are fitting. Within this range, she 
can fittingly care more or less. Not just one degree of caring seems fitting. 
Why is this so? It helps to consider other cases, independent of significance, 
where we are justified to have attitudes of varying strength. Take aesthetic value. 
Consider a good artwork, such as Klee’s little painting Dieser Stern lehrt beugen. And 
compare it to an absolute masterpiece like Tolstoy’s War and Peace, and to an amateur 
work like a clay sculpture Lila once produced in adolescence. Other things equal, 
intuitively, you cannot fittingly admire Klee’s small painting more than Tolstoy’s 
novel, or less than Lila’s sculpture. In doing so you would pretend it was more 
valuable than the former or less valuable than the latter, and that would be a 
misrepresentation. But compare Klee’s painting to another artwork that is far from 
dilettantish but not quite epoch making either—such as one of Bartók’s Romanian 
Folk Dances. Here, intuitively, you can fittingly feel the same degree of admiration 
toward them. But you can also fittingly feel somewhat more admiration at the 
painting than at the composition, and vice versa. None of these combinations of 
attitudes must be misrepresenting their worth.40  
There might be different ways to explain this. But a standard and I think 
plausible way of doing so is in terms of incommensurability in values or reasons. That 
a certain form of value gives rise to incommensurability means that instances of it 
are not representable by a single value function, but only by a set of value functions. 
Your attitudes are fitting if and only if the values they represent things as having 
accord with one of the functions in the set. More intuitively, we might say, instances 
of the value are not representable as a single determinate quantity (precisely k on 
some scale), but only as a range of values (somewhere between n and m). And your 
attitudes are fitting if and only if the values they represent things as having fall within 
that range.41 Thus in order to have fitting attitudes, you must have some attitudes 
 
40 Why not think the works of Klee and Bartók are precisely equally valuable? Here is the 
standard “small improvement argument.” Had Bartók chosen a slightly more mesmerizing 
melody, his piece would have been determinately (slightly) better than it is. But it would 
still not necessarily be determinately better than Klee’s painting. So the actual composition 
cannot be precisely equally as valuable as the painting. For classic defenses of the 
pervasiveness of such incommensurability, see, e.g., Raz, The Morality of Freedom, ch. 13; and 
Broome, “Is Incommensurability Vagueness?” For a classic challenge, see Chang, 
“Introduction.” 
41 Strictly speaking, the set- and range-theoretic statements are not equivalent. Let V be a 
set of value functions. It could be that on all individual functions in V, the value of x is 
greater than that of y (i.e., that for all v in V, v(x)>v(y)), and yet that the ranges of values 
assigned to x and y by different functions in V overlap (i.e., that for some u and w in V and 
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from this range, but may have any attitudes in it: you do not have conclusive 
(fittingness) reasons for one degree of emotion, but sufficient (fittingness) reasons 
for many. This can account for your discretion in response to art. Aesthetic value is 
not a precise determinate quantity. The value range of Klee’s painting lies fully 
between the ranges of Lila’s sculpture and Tolstoy’s novel. So in order to have fitting 
attitudes, you must admire it more than the former but less than the latter. But since 
the value ranges of the works by Klee and Bartók overlap, you can fittingly feel equal 
admiration toward them, or somewhat more admiration for either.42 
Incommensurability in this sense is arguably pervasive. There is ample 
incommensurability in badness, tragedy, or awesomeness, say—or rarely just a single 
degree of sadness, dismay, or awe you can fittingly feel about instantiations of these 
properties. Very plausibly, there is similar incommensurability in significance. 
Significance is not a precise determinate quantity. It does not give you conclusive 
(fittingness) reasons for one degree of caring, but sufficient (fittingness) reasons for 
different degrees. Lila cannot fittingly pretend that the recklessness of her 
acquaintance Grace in Anchorage concerns her less than Edward’s or more than 
Della’s. But compare Grace’s fault with an equal fault by a stranger in Lila’s 
neighborhood. In many such cases the significance resulting from Lila’s involvement 
with the wrongdoer will not be fully commensurable to that resulting from her 
involvement with the wronged. So Lila can fittingly care equally about these faults, 
or somewhat more about either of them. The incommensurability of significance 
gives her discretion in fitting caring.  
Indeed, it arguably gives her quite a lot of it. For one thing, the relevant 
incommensurabilities will be ample. Incommensurability arises especially when a 
property has a number of diverse and hard-to-measure factors. Aesthetic value is 
 
real number k, u(x)=w(y)=k). The set-theoretic formulation is more precise, or allows us to 
capture more fine-grained differences—and is thus standard in decision theory (see e.g., 
Dubra, Maccheroni and Ok, “Expected Utility Theory without the Completeness Axiom”; 
also Broome, “Is Incommensurability Vagueness?”). But since the range-theoretic 
statement is simpler, and the details do not matter for our purposes, I rely on that in what 
follows.  
42 For an analysis of incommensurability in terms of permissible ranges of attitudes, see, 
e.g., Rabinowicz, “Value Relations Revisited,” esp. 139n3; and relatedly Raz, 
“Incommensurability and Agency.” There is a related discussion about reasons for action: 
Why are you generally justified to do various actions, rather than required to do any one? 
For an explanation of such discretion in action in terms of incommensurability, see, e.g., 
Raz, Engaging Reason. My picture is also reminiscent of Gert’s account (see, e.g., “Requiring 
and Justifying”). Gert contrasts his account with the idea of incommensurability. But he 
also thinks the strength of reasons must be represented by value ranges, whose lower and 
upper bounds determine their “requiring” and “justifying” dimension respectively. The 
upshot of this is parallel to the picture I have sketched. For different accounts of our 
discretion in action, see, e.g., Greenspan, “Making Room for Options”; and Portmore, 
“Imperfect Reasons and Rational Options.” 
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determined by emotional depth, beauty, and immediacy, by the interplay of harmony 
and tension, and so on. These factors are diverse and hard to measure, and this 
grounds the wide incommensurabilities in art.43 Significance too is based on 
numerous factors, which are equally diverse and hard to measure. So here too 
incommensurabilities will be substantial. Moreover, they will multiply through their 
relations. Lila has a certain discretion with respect to how much she cares about Jack 
tout court, or about the demand for reliability as it applies to him, or the hours she has 
lost in fetching her saw. If she cares much, or little, about these background things, 
she may fittingly care correspondingly more or less about his fault. The 
incommensurabilities will grow with a ripple effect through the knots of the web of 
significance. And, indeed, if significance is always also relative as I have suggested, 
then the significance of Jack’s promise breaking will also depend on how much she 
cares about the train crash of her mother, or about a recent earthquake in the 
Philippines and so on, even if those things are not intrinsically connected to it at all. 
So Lila will have a broad range of ways of caring about Jack’s fault that are fitting.  
Hence the following picture suggests itself. In caring about Jack’s fault to a 
certain degree, she does not represent it as giving her conclusive (fittingness) reasons 
for this and only this degree of caring. She represents it as giving her sufficient 
(fittingness) reason to care to that degree. And due to the incommensurability in 
significance, she might have sufficient reasons for different degrees. Given the 
history between Lila and Jack, his own response to his negligence, the extent to 
which she was actually harmed, and so on, as well as a context of other value facts, 
there will be forms of caring about his promise breaking that are unfittingly detached, 
and others that are unfittingly involved. But in between these extremes, there will be 
a range of different fitting responses. In light of Lila’s complex relationship to Jack’s 
promise breaking, she may fittingly care considerably about it, and fittingly care 
rather less—just as you may fittingly feel different degrees of admiration for Klee’s 
little painting.44 
 
43 See, e.g., the standard arguments in Chang, “Introduction,” 14ff. 
44 In view of Allais’s claim that “wrongdoing entitles us to resent, but this does not mean 
that it obliges us to” (“Elective Forgiveness,” 647), it might be worth summarizing the 
senses in which, on the picture I have sketched, the fact that a certain emotion is fitting 
means you are “required” to feel it. There is a simple sense in which it does mean this. If 
the fact that x is F makes emotion E, and only E, fitting, then in order to have the (or a) 
fitting response to x’s being F, you must feel E. If you do not, you lack a fitting response 
to that fact. However, there are three different senses in which for all I have said 
“fittingness” is not “requiring,” but may be merely “permissive.” First, there is the more 
fundamental question about whether there is, say, a moral or prudential requirement to 
have fitting attitudes in the first place. Perhaps there is not. Thus even if you have unfitting 
attitudes, perhaps you are not violating any such requirement. Second, there is the form of 
emotional oblivion mentioned above. If you lack any representation of x’s being or not 
being F, you do not have unfitting emotions toward x’s being F. Indeed it might be that all 




7. An Account of Forgiveness 
This indicates a new account of forgiveness. Again, the stronger your resentment, 
the more serious you represent my fault as having been (in terms of wrongness and 
responsibility), or the more significant you represent it as being for you. And that 
you represent it as being very (or not so) significant for you means you represent it 
as being such that in virtue of your relationship to it, you have sufficient reasons to 
care greatly (or little) about it, as something for which I am blameworthy. That is 
how your blame registers more than my blameworthiness, and why you can fittingly 
refrain from blaming me even if I am blameworthy. And the overcoming of 
resentment in forgiveness revolves around this factor of significance.  
If Lila forgives Jack for his promise breaking, she does not care about it 
anymore, as something for which he is blameworthy. She comes to represent it as 
not being significant for her anymore, in this specific respect. She comes to represent 
Jack’s fault a bit like that of a stranger, at least as his blameworthiness goes. Now 
this does not mean that Lila would eschew any response to Jack’s fault, or no longer 
care about it tout court. There are other responses to Jack’s promise breaking besides 
the negative reactive emotions. Lila may respond with sadness to the incident and 
henceforth feel a sense of sorrow in Jack’s presence; she may respond with a desire 
to stay somewhat out of his way; or she may respond with curiosity and attempt to 
find out why Jack broke his promise. But these responses would not ultimately be 
made fitting by Jack’s being blameworthy for his fault. They would ultimately be made 
fitting, say, by the fact that Jack’s promise breaking was bad for Lila (e.g., if the oak 
fell on her house), or by the fact that it is evidence for the undesirability of future 
involvements, or by the fact that it promises interesting insights (e.g., about how to 
prevent promises being broken in the future). Again, I take it that what our being 
blameworthy for a fault ultimately makes fitting are specifically and only the negative 
reactive attitudes. So if Lila had these other responses, she would care about Jack’s 
fault in these other respects—as something that was bad, or evidence for the 
undesirability of involvement, or intellectually interesting. And all of these responses 
would be compatible with her having forgiven. In forgiving, she just comes to no 
longer care about the promise breaking specifically as something for which Jack is 
blameworthy. In this sense, she overcomes her resentment, due to its (putative) lack 
of significance for her in this specific respect. 
If all I have said is correct, this solves the problem from section 2. In no longer 
feeling resentment, Lila would come to represent Jack’s fault as being such that in 
virtue of her relationship to it she has sufficient reasons not to care about it anymore. 
 
Third, if there is incommensurability, it might be that x’s being F makes both E1 and 
(incompossible) E2 fitting. Then you might lack E1 and still have a fitting response to x’s 
being F—viz., by having E2. 
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And at least in some circumstances—perhaps if nothing much happened and Jack 
felt some remorse—this may certainly be true. So she may fittingly not feel 
resentment. In still feeling resentment, Lila would represent Jack’s fault as being such 
that she has sufficient reasons to still care about it. And this may also be true, even 
in the very same circumstances. Since significance is not a precise determinate 
quantity, but involves incommensurabilities, these circumstances will give her 
sufficient reasons for several degrees of caring. So even when she may fittingly not 
feel resentment, she may also fittingly still feel it. And note that if she does care less, 
she does not just lack any representational response to Jack’s fault. To represent it 
as insignificant is not to not represent it at all. So in no longer caring she would not 
just end up with emotions that are not unfitting. She may end up in a positively 
fitting emotional state. There is no real “paradoxy” in forgiveness. Our discretion in 
fitting forgiveness is part of our more general discretion in how much we care about 
things.45 As emphasized, that latter discretion has limits. But then our discretion in 
forgiveness has limits too. Sometimes—with remorseful wrongdoers whose wrong 
is long past and has not harmed us at all—resentment is no longer fitting. And 
sometimes—with unapologetic close wrongdoers who have just harmed us 
severely—resentment just is the fitting response. So I take it the proposal gets the 
measure of our discretion quite right. 
However, no longer caring about a wrong as something for which the 
wrongdoer is blameworthy plausibly is not sufficient for forgiveness. If Lila sought 
peace of mind, took a tranquillizer pill, and eventually no longer blamed Jack due to 
the chemistry of this pill, she has not forgiven. Neither has she done so if she does 
not care about his wrong only because her mother died and this rendered her 
indifferent about that promise. Nor is it forgiveness if out of contempt she no longer 
cared about Jack tout court. So we need to say more. Nothing of what I have said so 
far depends on how we explain why these ways of ceasing to care are not forgiveness. 
But let me add a proposal. Lila’s lack of resentment must be reason-responsive (not 
just the effect of some pill), and the relevant reasons must have their source at least 
partly in Jack (not just in some unrelated event) and in something that is lovable 
about him (not in what perhaps makes fitting contempt).46 So I suggest that Lila 
forgives Jack for his promise breaking if and only if she no longer cares about it 
partly out of goodwill toward him. Or more precisely: Lila forgives Jack for his promise 
breaking if and only if, while believing that he was at fault for it, and partly out of 
 
45 One might think that Lila’s relationship to the victim will not be relevant for forgiveness. 
After all, she is the victim, and (one might think) will have a fixed relationship to herself. 
But note that what matters is her relationship to the victim as a source of demands. And 
she can be more or less bound up with herself in this respect. For instance, if she is 
struggling for a sense of self-worth, she will experience the importance of others’ respect 
toward her firsthand. In this case, she may be more bound up with herself as a source of 
the demand for respect than if she has a fully firm sense of her worth. 
46 This is emphasized especially in Milam, “Reasons to Forgive.” 
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goodwill toward him, she no longer cares about his promise breaking as something 
for which he is blameworthy. To forgive just is to no longer care in this manner.  
What do I mean by this? As I will understand it, you j out of an attitude if your 
having that attitude plays an unmediated causal role in why you j . And it is in this 
sense that Lila might not care about Jack’s fault “out of goodwill” toward him. Her 
not caring might partly be the unmediated consequence of her having a positive 
attitude toward him. The phrase “unmediated” here is intended to rule out cases 
where Lila’s goodwill indirectly causes her not to care. If out of goodwill Lila intends 
to benefit Jack, and takes a pill that causes her not to care about his fault, she has 
not properly forgiven. In the sense I intend, she did not cease caring “out of 
goodwill,” but due to the effect of that pill. More positively, the process I mean is 
this. In a case of fitting forgiveness, there is some property of Jack that makes it 
fitting for Lila to feel goodwill toward him. Lila feels goodwill in response to that. 
But that property of Jack also makes his fault less significant for Lila as something 
for which he is blameworthy. So in coming to appreciate that property, Lila also 
comes to see his fault as less significant for her. And it is partly due to this that she 
ultimately does not care about it anymore as something for which he is blameworthy.  
Let us illustrate this with examples. The property of Jack that makes Lila’s 
goodwill fitting might be something that renders his promise breaking intrinsically less 
significant for her. Suppose Jack repented his fault. This means Lila is less bound up 
with the grounds of his being blameworthy for it. So on the account from section 5, 
it makes it fitting for her to care less about it. But it arguably also makes it fitting for 
her to feel goodwill toward him. If Lila comes to appreciate his remorse, responding 
with goodwill toward it, and therefore (among else) no longer cares about his 
promise breaking, she forgives him. But I think the relevant property of Jack might 
also be something that renders his promise breaking only relatively less significant for 
Lila—i.e., makes other things more significant, and thus Jack’s fault less significant 
in comparison. Suppose Jack beams with a disarmingly endearing cheerfulness, an 
adorable childlike gaiety, and despite all his weaknesses it is a precious delight to 
have him around. Or suppose he is diagnosed with a terrible disease, and 
undeservedly soon faces death. These facts have nothing to do with the grounds of 
his blameworthiness for that promise breaking. So they do not render it intrinsically 
less significant for Lila. But they make it less significant in the overall scheme of 
things, and specifically in her dealings with him. And they arguably also make it 
fitting for her to wish him well. If Lila comes to appreciate these aspects of Jack, 
responding with goodwill to them—with a love for her scatterbrained yet 
congenially joyful or pitiably unlucky neighbor—and therefore (among else) no 
longer cares about his promise breaking in the pertinent manner, she arguably also 
forgives him.47 But I say it must be partly out of goodwill that Lila no longer cares. 
 
47 Intuitions about whether such cases amount to “forgiveness” will be more disputed: 
Milam (“Reasons to Forgive”), say, would presumably deny it. I think they do. But my 
account could be modified to imply that they do not. We might require that the relevant 
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There may be other facts that render his fault less significant, and do not warrant 
any such goodwill. Perhaps Lila’s mother died on that evening, and this made our 
incident unimportant in comparison. Or perhaps Lila moved away, and is simply no 
longer involved with her former neighbor. These facts do not warrant goodwill 
toward Jack. So if it is only due to them that Lila no longer cares about his fault, she 
has not properly forgiven. But these facts do make his promise breaking less 
significant for her. So they can contribute to making it fitting for her not to care 
anymore, and help her actually not care. And as long as it is partly due to such facts 
that she does not care, and partly also out of goodwill—partly also in response to 
his remorse, say—they can contribute to making forgiveness fitting, and help her 
actually forgive. The threshold about when enough goodwill is involved will be 
vague. But this just mirrors that the concept of forgiveness is vague—and that there 
is a certain continuity between forgiveness and phenomena like oblivion or 
distraction.48 
So if all of this is correct, then pace Allais, not all ways of ceasing to hold the 
promise breaking against Jack amount to forgiveness. Forgiveness is a narrower 
phenomenon than that. It must in part be a genuine response to a (putative) fact about 
Jack. Also, Lila’s discretion in fitting forgiveness does not hinge on her epistemic 
limitations. It is fully grounded in the facts, or in the actual incommensurabilities of 
significance. And finally, blame and forgiveness are not all about assessing our 
characters. Of course it matters whether Jack’s promise breaking is (still) 
characteristic of him. If it is not, this renders his fault less significant for Lila, and 
may thus allow her to fittingly not feel resentment in response to it. Indeed, it also 
makes it fitting for her to feel goodwill toward him, and thus may allow her to 
fittingly forgive—or not blame him partly out of such goodwill. But the significance of 
Jack’s fault for Lila hinges on many other factors too, which do not depend on 
whether his unreliability is (still) characteristic. It depends on how close a 
relationship she (now) has to him, on precisely what kind of relationship they have, 
 
property of Jack must render his fault intrinsically (not just relatively) less significant for Lila. 
Note also that as I understand the phrase “out of goodwill,” it in effect implies a right-
kind-of-reason requirement for forgiveness: in forgiving, Lila does not care due to 
something that (putatively) renders Jack’s fault less significant, or is a fittingness reason not 
to care. 
48 Note: I think it is sufficient for forgiveness if it is partly out of goodwill that Lila now does 
not care about Jack’s fault. It need not have been partly out of goodwill that she originally 
ceased caring. Suppose she originally ceased caring about it out of contemptuous disregard. 
But she later overcomes that disregard, and would come to care about Jack’s fault and resent 
him again, were it not for the goodwill she now feels toward him in response to his sincere 
apology. In an important sense, I think, Lila then forgives him. Thus the process of 
“overcoming” resentment that constitutes forgiveness need not end once Lila lacks any 
resentment. It ends once she lacks it for the right reasons—i.e., once she does not care 
partly out of goodwill. (To that extent I am convinced by the arguments in Schönherr, 
“When Forgiveness Comes Easy.”) 
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and on what role the demand for reliability plays in it. It depends on what 
ramifications it had, for Lila’s afternoon or her house or her sense of self-worth. 
And it also depends on other facts in the context, about Jack, but also about Lila’s 
mother or even the Philippines. If these factors play out right, they too can make 
Jack’s fault less significant for Lila, or allow her to fittingly not feel resentment in 
response to it. And some of them—such as his general cheerfulness or undeserved 
bad health—may also make it fitting to feel goodwill toward him, and thus allow her 
to fittingly forgive. So sometimes, Lila may fittingly forgive even if the promise 
breaking is expressive of Jack’s character. And sometimes she may still fittingly 
resent him even though it is not. Being sensitive to all facets of significance, blame 
and forgiveness are complex responses indeed.49  
 
8. Conclusion 
Let me wrap up. I have introduced a version of the standard account of forgiveness. 
I have explicated a notion of the significance of value facts, provided an account of 
when such facts are significant for us in terms of their grounds, and outlined what 
this normatively implies. And I have argued that an account of forgiveness based on 
this phenomenon dissolves the apparent paradoxy and satisfies a number of 
desiderata. The account is also intuitively plausible. If Lila is a forgiving person, she 
will know that people go wrong. But she will be disposed not to dwell on their faults 
more than necessary, to distance herself from them—a bit as if they had happened far 
off. She will care about the good in people. If Lila is an unforgiving person, she may 
know that people do admirable things, and may not see their faults as worse. But she 
will be disposed to dwell on these faults if she may.  
Naturally, there are many open questions. Most importantly perhaps, I have 
raised a number of general issues—about the representational content of emotions, 
 
49 It might also help to compare the present account to Hieronymi, “Articulating an 
Uncompromising Forgiveness.” Hieronymi thinks your resentment is warranted in 
response to an action that wronged you, for which the agent was responsible, and that still 
makes a threatening claim to the effect that you may be treated thus. The wrongdoer’s 
apology will undo that claim, and thus make your resentment lose its “point” (“Articulating 
an Uncompromising Forgiveness,” 548), or become inappropriate. To forgive, she 
suggests, is to retract your resentment in response to that. Hieronymi does not say so. But 
perhaps one may interpret that threatening claim as making the fault significant for you. If 
so, then besides explicitly understanding the relevant issue as the general category of 
significance, there are again three main ways in which the present proposal goes beyond 
hers. Most importantly, it accounts for the complexity of forgiveness (and especially for 
forgiving the unapologetic) by allowing that a fault’s significance depends on much more 
than its posing a threat. Partly in virtue of this, it can (and does explicitly) account for our 
discretion in forgiving. And at the same time, it elucidates why not all ways of overcoming 
resentment (even in response to apology) must amount to forgiveness.  
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the grounds and shape of their agent-relativity, or the extent to and reasons for 
which we are required to feel them. Some of these topics seem underexplored. It 
would be important to elaborate more on them. Being a version of the standard 
account, the proposal also raises familiar questions about forgiveness. Forgiveness 
is something that usually has normative effects—e.g., concerning the wrongdoer’s 
duty toward the victim to repent.50 It is something that some people (notably the 
victim) seem in a privileged position to offer.51 And it is something we sometimes 
do with a goal.52 An account of forgiveness must explain these facts. I am confident 
that the present proposal has the resources to do so. But these are matters for 
another paper.  
It would also be interesting to explore further dimensions of significance. For 
instance, presumably the significance of a value fact matters not just for attitudes, 
but also for action. We have stronger reason to act in response to a value fact the 
more significant it is.53 Also, presumably our freedom not to care extends to other 
emotions and beyond people’s faults, onto facts of life more generally—pains and 
losses and defeats. Thus there will be ways of “forgiving life.” Some people get 
habitually worked up about the foul and ugly and deplorable things, and stand aloof 
from what is worthy of gratitude or joy. And some people are just the opposite. And 
the difference seems important. In some instances, and as with forgiveness proper, 
a heightened concern with the good might amount to a dubious blindness to reality. 
But then again, if done in the right manner, it might also constitute an innocuous 
form of positivity and a reliable path to contentment.54  
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50 See, e.g., Warmke, “The Normative Significance of Forgiveness”; or Bennett, “The 
Alteration Thesis.” 
51 See, e.g., Murphy and Hampton, Forgiveness and Mercy, 32; Walker, “Third Parties and the 
Social Scaffolding of Forgiveness”; also Pettigrove, “The Standing to Forgive”; and Radzik, 
“Moral Bystanders and the Virtue of Forgiveness.” 
52 See, e.g., Hieronymi, “Articulating an Uncompromising Forgiveness”; and Fricker, 
“Forgiveness.” 
53 There is a straightforward link between attitudes and action if we regard your motivation to 
act in accordance with the reasons (for action) provided by a value fact as a fitting attitude 
toward it. Then the more significant a value fact is for you the more motivation to act on 
these reasons it is fitting for you to have. That the suffering of a friend is more significant 
for you than that of a stranger, as something bad, say, does not just mean it is fitting for 
you to respond with more sorrow. It also means it is fitting for you to be more motivated 
to help them. This might explain many of our intuitions of partiality.  
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